American involvement in Vietnam can stretch back as far as the end of World War II, depending on how you define “involvement,” but one thing is for sure; when the U.S. committed its combat troops to defend South Vietnam, things got hot almost immediately. The most stunning example of the ferocity of Vietnam battlegrounds is the 1965 Battle of Ia Drang, the first time the U.S. Army fought a major battle against the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN), North Vietnam’s regular forces.
There are actually several notable firsts that occurred in the Battle of Ia Drang. It was the first time the U.S. employed a large-scale helicopter air assault and the first time B-52 Stratofortress bombers were used as tactical support. Both of these historic firsts would have a huge effect on the battle.
The Beginning of Airmobile Assault on November 14
PAVN and Viet Cong guerilla forces controlled much of the South Vietnamese countryside by the end of 1964. Their main military forces were based in the central highlands, mountainous, almost impassable jungle areas that made attacks from motorized vehicles ineffective. The U.S. decided to use the new tactic of air mobility assaults to hit the communists based there.
The plan was to helo in a battalion-sized force and use helicopters to resupply and extract them. Heavy weapon support would come in the form of artillery, rocket fire, and close-air support aircraft. Lt. Col. Hal Moore, the commander of the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, was ordered to launch an airmobile assault on November 14 and then to conduct search and destroy operations the following day.
What American planners didn’t know was that the area was flooded with PAVN forces who were planning an attack on the U.S. Special Forces and South Vietnamese (ARVN) base at Plei Me, some 45 kilometers away. They also had heavy weapons and anti-aircraft guns that U.S. leadership didn’t think were present.
When the 1,000 Americans and 900 ARVN troops landed in the central highlands, there were 2,500 PAVN and Viet Cong troops waiting for them – they were already surrounded and outnumbered.
Fighting was centered on two helicopter landing zones. The first was Col. Moore’s LZ X-Ray. LZ Albany was situated further north in the Ia Drang Valley. Before Moore’s force landed, the area was bombarded with air strikes and rockets, which signaled the PAVN that something was amiss. They abandoned the attack on Plei Me and moved to LZ X-Ray.
The first lift of American troops landed just after 11:18 in the morning. By 12:15, the first shots of the Battle of Ia Drang were fired – they landed just 200 meters from a regiment of communist infantry. The Americans didn’t retreat; they advanced. 2nd Platoon, under the command of Lt. Henry Herrick, moved so fast and far it was cut off from the rest of the 7th Cavalry, while the rest of 1/7 regrouped to form a defensive perimeter as the airlifts of men and supplies kept coming in.
The North Vietnamese were relentless in their attacks on the Americans, charging position after position, seemingly unconcerned with dying in their repeated assaults. The fire was so heavy the Americans were unable to dig foxholes, as rising up from the ground was suicide. Helicopters landed among that same intense, close-in enemy fire. Keeping close, it turned out, was an intentional tactic for the Vietnamese.
360-Degree Perimeter around the LZ
Regular PAVN and Viet Cong forces didn’t enjoy the same kind of powerful close-air support the Americans did, and it was a huge problem in pitched battles. The PAVN learned early on that keeping the fighting close to American troops would negate the U.S. advantage in air strikes, artillery, and rockets.
Troops landing in the LZ took immediate, heavy fire and quickly became casualties. The soldiers began to call ineffective artillery fire around the LZ to prevent an all-out charging PAVN assault. By 1520, the Battalion had fully landed and created a 360-degree perimeter around the LZ. By the end of day one, the perimeter had been established, and the 2/7 cavalry reinforced the 1/7.
That didn’t end the assaults. PAVN forces launched three major charges against the perimeter throughout the night but were beaten back with grenades, rifles, and the help of some accurate artillery support. In the morning, Moore ordered reconnaissance patrols in the pre-dawn hours, but the Americans didn’t have to wait long. The PAVN then launched a two-pronged attack against the perimeter.
The Americans took heavier casualties than usual but held their ground. Then the communists launched another attack that led Col. Moore to report a “broken arrow” back to headquarters – he believed he was about to be overrun. It brought all available aircraft to the unit’s defense. Moore’s men marked the area with smoke for the aircraft and then called in dangerously close artillery support.
As the 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry began to land at nearby LZ Victor and move toward Moore’s beleaguered troops; a friendly fire napalm attack lit up the American and North Vietnamese. Fighting on the second day began before dawn, but after the intense morning fight, the PAVN began to withdraw by 1000.
B-52 Bombers Began Bombing the Withdrawing PAVN Forces
Although still harassed by sporadic enemy fire and NVA snipers, the 1/7 Cavalry went and found Herrick’s lost Platoon. Although Herrick was killed in the fighting and they had been cut off from the main force, the unit’s own defensive perimeter held throughout the night. Moore’s unit had been weakened but not destroyed, and he refused to relinquish command of his men to fresh incoming units.
Later in the afternoon of November 15, B-52 bombers began carpet bombing the withdrawing PAVN forces to the west of LZ X-Ray. Moore was again ordered to leave the battlefield, this time by the overall commander of American forces in Vietnam, Gen. William Westmoreland, to brief him on the battle. Again, Moore refused to leave his men. As night fell on the second day, the PAVN had regrouped and began to probe the American lines.
Aftermath of the Battle of Ia Drang
Four early morning attacks by hundreds of communist troops erupted across the American line. Before the sun came up, artillery observers, machine gunners, and riflemen repelled vicious assaults from the PAVN forces with few casualties. The tide had finally begun to turn. By the time the sun came up, the North Vietnamese no longer had the manpower to keep fighting at X-Ray.
Both sides claimed victory at LZ X-Ray. The Americans lost a total of 79 killed and 121 wounded, while the communists lost an estimated 1,215. U.S. leaders believed they could win the war by high body counts and estimated they had a 10 to 1 kill ratio at Ia Drang. The North Vietnamese learned they could get in close to the enemy to negate the advantage of American firepower. Even Col. Moore would later say that fighting the Americans to a draw was a victory for the North Vietnamese.
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The story of Ia Drang usually excludes the initial contact. Bravo Troop of the 1/9th Air Cavalry unit located what was thought to be a company sized unit. Their rifle platoon was inserted and quickly came under intense fire. They were surrounded by nightfall and would be wiped out if not extracted. The Squadron Commander, Col. John Stockton, requested permission to extract the platoon at night. Gen. Knowles, the ADC denied permission as a night extraction had never been done. Col. Stockton disobeyed the order and successfully extracted the rifle platoon at night. He was relieved of command for disobeying an order. He was later exonerated by a board of officers.
I recently found 364 pages of letters our father wrote to his wife, Julie, during his service inthe Korean War. Interesting reading.For any veterans who have chafed with desk duty, you will see the humor in Dad’s reassurance to Mom++that he was in no danger as the Assistant G-3 for the 7th Division.++ How much Hal G. Moore suffered during the Korean War.page 80 from A Soldier Once and Always by MIKE GUARDIAHal G. Moore as the Division Assistant G-3. “everything here is paper work.”Hal G. Moore “Life at Division was LUSH by war time standards.The Staff Officers Mess had a full service bar where one could buy martinis, Manhattans, and other finespirits, every night after dinner, the officers could see the latest Hollywood films at the DIVISION moviehouse.Hal G. Moore, Commanding Officer, of the heavy mortar company (for only 12 days ) 8 July 1952,23 July 1952.He knew nothing about mortars!page 67 from A Soldier Once and Always by MIKE GUARDIAThe company CP [ command post ] where I hang my hat is 2,800 yards behind the MLR.Life is very good around here . Fine chow and a good, dry place to sleep with a cot and all.Hal G. Moore “No complaints whatsoever.” page 70 from A Soldier Once and Always by MIKE GUARDIAAs Regimental S-3, within only a few weeks, had drafted three ANTI – AIRBORNEOPERATIONS!!FACT: NORTH KOREA had no AIRBORNE FORCESThe 7th Infantry Division Commander orchestrated Hal G. Moore’s FAKE COMBAT,by personally placing Hal G. Moore in K company, when they were at Sindam -Ni, FAKE COMBAT for Hal G. Moore commanded Company K an Infantry unit ( for only 16 days ) from the 6 FEB1953 to Feb 22 1953, While they were stationed at Sindam – Ni some 50 miles behind and south of the MLR.The 7th Infantry Division LEFT the NLR at the END of OCT 1952.The 7th Infantry Division RETURNED to the MLR at the END of FEB 1953To get an early promotion to Major Hal G. Moore had to serve in a combat position, he didn’t!!so Hal G. Moore should not have made any more rank than CAPT>Hal G. Moore did not want the days he was in command of K company to show on his military records as it would look like he messed up as an S-3, NOPE it would show that he was never in any combat and not meeting the requirement for MajorFAKE COMBAT for Hal G. Moore commanded Company K an Infantry unit ( for only 16 days ) from the 6 FEB 1953 to Feb 22 1953, While they were stationed at Sindam – Ni some 50 miles behind and south of the MLR. The 7th Infantry Division LEFT the NLR at the END of OCT 1952.The 7th Infantry Division RETURNED to the MLR at the END of FEB 1953What Hal G. Moore didn’t have to do during the Korean War.picture Triangle hill U.S. Soldiers 7th Division.
Joseph Lee Galloway’s original story of Landing Zone X-RAY Nov,14-16, 1965
Twenty JAMESTOWN ( N.Y. ) POST- JOURNAL- Wednesday Evening,November 17,1965
WOUNDED SOLDIER LOSES HALF HIS PLATOON IN BITTER CHU PONG FRAY
By JOSEPH GALLOWAY
Chu Pong Mountain, South Viet Nam ( UPI )—- The soldiers eyes were red from loss of sleep, and maybe a bit
from crying too, now that it was all over.
A three-day growth of beard stubbled his cheeks. But was hard to see because of the dirt. He was hurt, in terrible
pain, but you’d never know it. Slivers of shrapnel had ripped his chest and spared his leg.
He sat on the landing zone below the Chu Pong mountain where more Americans had died than ever before in
a battle against Communists in a war over Viet Nam He had gone through hell — three days of it— and still a
bit dazed, more from lack of sleep then his wounds, though. When I walked up to him, he spoke, But not to me
in particular, nor to the other guys sitting around sipping the first hot cup of coffee they had since the fight
began.
Loses a Friend
” I took care of 14 of ’em myself,” He said. “They were tough little bastards. You had to shoot them to pieces
before they quit coming . . . just rip them apart.”
I squatted on my heels waiting for him to say more, But he didn’t. Somebody told me he had lost half of his
platoon, including a friend he had served with for more than eight years. “What is his name?” I ask.
” It’s not important,” the sergeant slouching nearby said. “He’s just one of us and he did a damn good job.”
Everyone did a damn good job. And nobody knew it better than Gen. Knowles, task force commander and
deputy commander of the 1st Air Cavalry.
“These men were just great,” he told me. “They were absolutely tremendous. I’ve never seen a better job
anywhere, anytime,”
Back From Battle
Monday another American soldier walked out of the jungle into the valley of death. Bullets whizzed over his
head and kicked up dirt at his feet.
” Get down you fool!” We shouted.
The GI kept walking, He carried no weapon, He walked straight and tall.
A mortar shell exploded nearby, He didn’t waver, Shrapnel chopped off branches above my head. But the
American out there in the open came on until he was within a few feet of the battalion command bunker. He
looked funny, dazed.
Then we knew, he was shell shocked. He paused for a moment and looked around He recognized the aid
station set up under the trees and walked toward it.
Just as the soldier reached the station he slumped to his knees, then pitched forward on his face, That is when
we saw his back for the first time.
It wasn’t pretty, It had been blown open by a communist mortar.
Medics were unable to reach the soldier because of the almost solid wall of communist bullets and jagged steel
fragments coming from the jungle. So he walked out, The bullets and mortar did not bother him anymore, Hehad his
Veterans Cried
The men of the U.S. 1st Air Cavalry fought like heroes. They died the same way, Some took their wounds
without a whimper. Seasoned Veterans cried.
Col. Hal Moore of Bardstown, Ky., the commanding officer of the 7th Battalion, 1st cavalry, Came over to me,
++ tears streaming down his face, His men were catching from the slopes of this mountain range less than five
miles from the Cambodian border.
I’m kind of emotional about this, so excuse me,” Moore said to me. “But I want you to tell the American people
that these men are fighters.
“Look at them.”
Moore pointed to a Negro soldier lying in the shade of a tree. A Communist bullet had torn a huge hole in his
stomach The soldier had his hands over the wound. You could see him bite his lip. He was in terrific pain, But
he made no whimper as he waited for a medical helicopter.
” Look at them,” Moore said again. ” They’re great and the American people ought to know it.
WAR “ACCIDENT”
It was shortly after 8:30 a.m. Monday when one of those terrible accidents of war happened.
I was sitting in the command bunker, A mound of dirt screening us from the communist snipers, looking at the
wounded in the aid station just a few yards away.
Suddenly, I felt a searing heat on my face.
An American fighter-bomber had misjudged the Communist positions, and dropped a load of napalm. The
flaming jelly gasoline, impossible to shake or scrape off once it hits skin, splashed along the ground in a huge
dragon’s tail of fire less then 25 yards away.
Screams penetrated the roar of the flames.
+++two Americans stumbled out of the inferno.+++
Their hair burned off in an instant. their clothes were incinerated.
” Good God!” Moore cried. Another plane was making a run over the same area. The colonel grabbed a radio.
” You’re dropping napalm on us!” he shouted. ” Stop those damn planes.”
At almost the last second, the second plane pulled up and away, its napalm tanks still hanging from the wings.
It was an hour before a medical helicopter could get into the area and tend to the two burned men. One GI was
a huge mass of blisters, the other not quite so bad. Somehow his legs had escaped the flames. But he had
breathed fire into his lungs and he wheezed for air.
Joe Lee Galloway++A MEDIC ASK ME TO HELP GET THE MEN INTO THE HELICOPTER WHEN IT ARRIVED. THERE WERE
NO LITTERS. TENDERLY, WE PICKED THE SOLDIERS UP. I HELD A LEG OF THE MOST SERIOUSLY
BURNED MAN. I WASN’T TENDER ENOUGH. A BIG PATCH OF BURNED SKIN CAME OFF IN MY HAND
VC BATTALIONS
Chu Pong Mountain rises 2,500 feet from the valley below. From the top, you could almost lob a mortar shell
into Cambodia. The mountain slope were heavily jungled. And they hid at least two battalions of North
Vietnamese Army regulars—- possibly the same troops who pinned down two companies of air cavalrymen not
far away about a week ago.
The cavalry were looking for them, spoiling for a fight. They found the Communist Monday and dropped by
helicopter into a small landing zone about the size of a football field at the base of the mountain on the valleyfloor.
One platoon got about 300 yards up the mountain before the Communist opened up. From Behind, cut it off
and fired on the main cavalry force from three sides with small arms, heavy machine-guns, and mortars.
Time and again, the cavalrymen tried to move in and help the platoon’ pull back, It was futile. The fire was to
heavy. The platoon spent the night on the mountainside. Their losses were heavy, but the damage to the
Communist was said to be heavier.
“We got 70 communist bodies stacked up in front of our positions,” the platoon leader radioed back Monday.
Men Dying
It was shortly before noon Sunday when the cavalrymen swept down in the area about 12 miles west of Pleiku.
Ever since the nine day battle around the Special Forces camp at Plei Me, the cavalrymen have been
sweeping the jungles and running into sporadic contact with hard-core Communist units.
++Brig. Gen. Richard Knowles, deputy commander of the air cavalry division, OFFERED ME A RIDE IN HISHELICOPTER.
WE CIRCLED OVER THE BATTLE GROUND. Air strikes went in below us. An American A1E skyraider was hit
on a low- level bombing run, and the pilot had no chance to bail out. The plane crashed and exploded in a
cluster of trees.
Men are dying down there, but they are doing their job. “This is good,” Knowles said.” This is what we came for.
We’ve got a U.S. battalion well -equipped down there.”
Many Dead
I got my chance to join the men on the ground about 8 P.M. I went with a helicopter loaded with supplies and
ammunition.
we were level with the middle of the mountain and in the darkness we could see the muzzle flashes of rifles
and machine-gun spitting bullets at us. I said a prayer.
Sgt.Maj Basil Plumley of Columbus, Ga., met us at the landing zone, and led me back to Col. Moore’s
command bunker.
” Watch your step,” Plumley said, ” There were dead people, all over here.” They were dead Americans many
wrapped in ponchos.
At Day break Monday, Medical helicopters began landing and taking off again with the wounded.
A detail was assign the job of collecting weapons and ammunition from the wounded before they wereevacuated.
Jimmy D Nakayama casualty report. no crushed ankles or torn skin.
My friend was there
– “Steel ring”.
Lt. Gen. Richard Knowles, Hal(G) Moore’s 1/7 Air Cavalry Battalion once inserted at LZ X-Ray was heavily
protected by “a ring of steel” put up by the Division Artillery.
Furthermore, Knowles had “every route into and out of the area hit hard around the clock” – to interdict NVA
troops of the 32nd and 33rd to come in the area.
Lt. Gen. Richard Knowles wrote-up his narrative of the LZ X-Ray Battle in May 1983 at the request of Lt. General Hal Moore who was seeking help in writing his upcoming book, We Were Soldiers Once … And Young co-authored by Joseph Galloway. Moore’s book was published in 1992. Knowles sent his narrative to Moore with a cover letter dated 20 June 1983.
– “Steel ring”.
Lt. Gen. Richard Knowles, Hal(G) Moore’s 1/7 Air Cavalry Battalion once inserted at LZ X-Ray was heavily
protected by “a ring of steel” put up by the Division Artillery.
Furthermore, Knowles had “every route into and out of the area hit hard around the clock” – to interdict NVA
troops of the 32nd and 33rd to come in the area – and reinforced the 1/7 Air Cavalry Battalion with the 2/7 and
2/5 to counter the NVA 7th and 9th Battalions belonging to the 66th Regiment as well as to cover the
withdrawal of the 1/7 set for November 16.
+The 1/7 Air Cavalry Battalion was at all times safe, allowing Knowles to check in at the LZ X-Ray during the
heat of the battle in the afternoon of November 15, as well as Colonel Tim Brown in the morning of the same
day.
The reason for Knowles’ visit was to assess the situation and see if(Hal G. ) Moore was willing and able to
handle the withdrawal of his battalion. (Hal G. Moore and Joe Lee Galloway, page 210) We Were Soldiers Once … And Young< A book that is FICTION
That morning, at 9:30 am, Brown landed at LZ X-Ray to establish a forward brigade command post to execute the withdrawal of Moore's 1/7 Air Cavalry Battalion. But Moore refused to relinquish the command of his battalion. (Moore and Galloway, page 202)
Around midnight, Moore was ordered to report to Saigon the next morning to brief General Westmoreland and his staff about the battle. Moore vehemently objected to the order. (Moore and Galloway, page 216)
Before having the 1/7 Air Cavalry Battalion inserted at LZ X-Ray, Knowles was aware that the NVA 66th Regiment, whose headquarters was located nearby the insertion point, did not have its battalion of 14.5mm twin-barrel anti-aircraft guns and its battalion of 120mm mortars, which were both en route down the infiltration trail and scheduled to meet the 66th Regiment at Pleime, for the attack. These two battalions, if present at LZ X-Ray with their heavy guns and mortars positionned on the hillsides overlooking the landing zone, would have caused havoc to the troop insertion.
It is obvious that the 1/7 Air Cavalry Battalion was inserted at LZ X-Ray to establish a presence as a diversionary ploy and not an attack threat.
– “Mad minute”.
Knowles gives an explanation for the Harassment and Interdiction (H&I) night firing conducted by one outpost of Bob Tully’s 2/5 Air Cavalry Battalion: the men of that outpost “were due to leave for the U.S. that day and they did not want to become casualties on their last night".
In the cover letter, Knowles advised Hal Moore to include details of his battalion’s “Mad Minute” in his coming book.
Hal G. MOORE: OK. About 10 minutes before we took off for (LZ X-Ray) the Ia Drang Valley in the initial
assault, I received information that there were three battalions of enemy – and a battalion of North Vietnamese
is around 500 men – that there were three battalions of the enemy within two miles of our landing zone.
And so I sifted this through my head and immediately realized that we could be into a fight almost immediately
upon landing and which, indeed, we were!!
Hal G. Moore that fact didn't really bother me.
Lt. Gen. Richard Knowles wrote-up his narrative of the LZ X-Ray Battle in May 1983 at the request of Lt. General Hal Moore who was seeking help in writing his upcoming book, We Were Soldiers Once … And Young co-authored by Joseph Galloway. Moore’s book was published in 1992. Knowles sent his narrative to Moore with a cover letter dated 20 June 1983.
– “Steel ring”.
Lt. Gen. Richard Knowles, Hal(G) Moore’s 1/7 Air Cavalry Battalion once inserted at LZ X-Ray was heavily
protected by “a ring of steel” put up by the Division Artillery.
Furthermore, Knowles had “every route into and out of the area hit hard around the clock” – to interdict NVA
troops of the 32nd and 33rd to come in the area – and reinforced the 1/7 Air Cavalry Battalion with the 2/7 and
2/5 to counter the NVA 7th and 9th Battalions belonging to the 66th Regiment as well as to cover the
withdrawal of the 1/7 set for November 16.
+The 1/7 Air Cavalry Battalion was at all times safe, allowing Knowles to check in at the LZ X-Ray during the
heat of the battle in the afternoon of November 15, as well as Colonel Tim Brown in the morning of the same
day.
The reason for Knowles' visit was to assess the situation and see if(Hal G. ) Moore was willing and able to
handle the withdrawal of his battalion. (Hal G. Moore and Joe Lee Galloway, page 210) We Were Soldiers Once … And Young< A book that is FICTION
That morning, at 9:30 am, Brown landed at LZ X-Ray to establish a forward brigade command post to execute the withdrawal of Moore's 1/7 Air Cavalry Battalion. But Moore refused to relinquish the command of his battalion. (Moore and Galloway, page 202)
Around midnight, Moore was ordered to report to Saigon the next morning to brief General Westmoreland and his staff about the battle. Moore vehemently objected to the order. (Moore and Galloway, page 216)
Before having the 1/7 Air Cavalry Battalion inserted at LZ X-Ray, Knowles was aware that the NVA 66th Regiment, whose headquarters was located nearby the insertion point, did not have its battalion of 14.5mm twin-barrel anti-aircraft guns and its battalion of 120mm mortars, which were both en route down the infiltration trail and scheduled to meet the 66th Regiment at Pleime, for the attack. These two battalions, if present at LZ X-Ray with their heavy guns and mortars positionned on the hillsides overlooking the landing zone, would have caused havoc to the troop insertion.
It is obvious that the 1/7 Air Cavalry Battalion was inserted at LZ X-Ray to establish a presence as a diversionary ploy and not an attack threat.
– “Mad minute”.
Knowles gives an explanation for the Harassment and Interdiction (H&I) night firing conducted by one outpost of Bob Tully’s 2/5 Air Cavalry Battalion: the men of that outpost “were due to leave for the U.S. that day and they did not want to become casualties on their last night".
In the cover letter, Knowles advised Hal Moore to include details of his battalion’s “Mad Minute” in his coming book.
Hal G. MOORE: OK. About 10 minutes before we took off for (LZ X-Ray) the Ia Drang Valley in the initial
assault, I received information that there were three battalions of enemy – and a battalion of North Vietnamese
is around 500 men – that there were three battalions of the enemy within two miles of our landing zone.
And so I sifted this through my head and immediately realized that we could be into a fight almost immediately
upon landing and which, indeed, we were!!
Hal G. Moore that fact didn't really bother me.
Hal G. MOORE: OK. About 10 minutes before we took off for (LZ X-Ray) the Ia Drang Valley in the initial
assault, I received information that there were three battalions of enemy – and a battalion of North Vietnamese
is around 500 men – that there were three battalions of the enemy within two miles of our landing zone.
And so I sifted this through my head and immediately realized that we could be into a fight almost immediately
upon landing and which, indeed, we were!!
Hal G. Moore that fact didn't really bother me.
+The 1/7 Air Cavalry Battalion was at all times safe, allowing Knowles to check in at the LZ X-Ray during the
heat of the battle in the afternoon of November 15, as well as Colonel Tim Brown in the morning of the same
day.
– “Steel ring”.
Lt. Gen. Richard Knowles, Hal(G) Moore’s 1/7 Air Cavalry Battalion once inserted at LZ X-Ray was heavily
protected by “a ring of steel” put up by the Division Artillery.
Furthermore, Knowles had “every route into and out of the area hit hard around the clock” – to interdict NVA
troops of the 32nd and 33rd to come in the area.
Lt. Gen. Richard Knowles wrote-up his narrative of the LZ X-Ray Battle in May 1983 at the request of Lt. General Hal Moore who was seeking help in writing his upcoming book, We Were Soldiers Once … And Young co-authored by Joseph Galloway. Moore’s book was published in 1992. Knowles sent his narrative to Moore with a cover letter dated 20 June 1983.
– “Steel ring”.
Lt. Gen. Richard Knowles, Hal(G) Moore’s 1/7 Air Cavalry Battalion once inserted at LZ X-Ray was heavily
protected by “a ring of steel” put up by the Division Artillery.
Furthermore, Knowles had “every route into and out of the area hit hard around the clock” – to interdict NVA
troops of the 32nd and 33rd to come in the area – and reinforced the 1/7 Air Cavalry Battalion with the 2/7 and
2/5 to counter the NVA 7th and 9th Battalions belonging to the 66th Regiment as well as to cover the
withdrawal of the 1/7 set for November 16.
+The 1/7 Air Cavalry Battalion was at all times safe, allowing Knowles to check in at the LZ X-Ray during the
heat of the battle in the afternoon of November 15, as well as Colonel Tim Brown in the morning of the same
day.
The reason for Knowles' visit was to assess the situation and see if(Hal G. ) Moore was willing and able to
handle the withdrawal of his battalion. (Hal G. Moore and Joe Lee Galloway, page 210) We Were Soldiers Once … And Young< A book that is FICTION
That morning, at 9:30 am, Brown landed at LZ X-Ray to establish a forward brigade command post to execute the withdrawal of Moore's 1/7 Air Cavalry Battalion. But Moore refused to relinquish the command of his battalion. (Moore and Galloway, page 202)
Around midnight, Moore was ordered to report to Saigon the next morning to brief General Westmoreland and his staff about the battle. Moore vehemently objected to the order. (Moore and Galloway, page 216)
Before having the 1/7 Air Cavalry Battalion inserted at LZ X-Ray, Knowles was aware that the NVA 66th Regiment, whose headquarters was located nearby the insertion point, did not have its battalion of 14.5mm twin-barrel anti-aircraft guns and its battalion of 120mm mortars, which were both en route down the infiltration trail and scheduled to meet the 66th Regiment at Pleime, for the attack. These two battalions, if present at LZ X-Ray with their heavy guns and mortars positionned on the hillsides overlooking the landing zone, would have caused havoc to the troop insertion.
It is obvious that the 1/7 Air Cavalry Battalion was inserted at LZ X-Ray to establish a presence as a diversionary ploy and not an attack threat.
– “Mad minute”.
Knowles gives an explanation for the Harassment and Interdiction (H&I) night firing conducted by one outpost of Bob Tully’s 2/5 Air Cavalry Battalion: the men of that outpost “were due to leave for the U.S. that day and they did not want to become casualties on their last night".
In the cover letter, Knowles advised Hal Moore to include details of his battalion’s “Mad Minute” in his coming book.
Hal G. MOORE: OK. About 10 minutes before we took off for (LZ X-Ray) the Ia Drang Valley in the initial
assault, I received information that there were three battalions of enemy – and a battalion of North Vietnamese
is around 500 men – that there were three battalions of the enemy within two miles of our landing zone.
And so I sifted this through my head and immediately realized that we could be into a fight almost immediately
upon landing and which, indeed, we were!!
Hal G. Moore that fact didn't really bother me.
Hal G. Moore was a fantasist and a liar.
Quote Hal G. Moore was a fantasist and a Liar “In 1957 I help write Air Assault tactics!” A LIE.
In 1963 the 11 Air Assault started.
Hal G. Moore’s battalion the 2/23 was from the 2nd Infantry Division, they were attached to the 11 Air Assault
in 1964.
Hal G. Moore “I had 18 months training in the 11 Air Assault.” 1964-1965. true.
Fantasist and Liar Hal G. Moore’s claimed he had come up with a new concepts & techniques for the Air
Assault on LZ X-Ray Nov,14-16,1965.
But that tactic was already in the manual for the 11 Air Assault, in the 1957 FM 57-35
Army Transport Aviation-Combat Operations!! By Officers Hal G. Moore claims to have worked with in 1957.
Fantasist and Liar Hal G. Moore in 1957 “I was in on the concept of Air Mobility with Gavin, Norton, Seneff
Williams”.
There were two departments in the Air Mobility Department, Air Assault and Air Borne.
The Air Borne Department was where Hal G. Moore was assigned to and had nothing to do with the other
department, the Air Assault Department, BUT Hal G. Moore was always intruding in on the other group the Air
Assault Department.
Hal G. Moore was very officious, with the Air Assault Department’s Group.
As a fantasist and a liar Hal G. Moore claimed he was in both, the Air Assault branch and the Airborne branch.
Hal G. Moore with 2 1/2 years writing, and 18 months of training in Airmobile tactics in the 11 Air Assault
Division Test, for a total of 4 years and yet Hal G. Moore retained nothing about Airmobile tactics.
From Hal Moore A Soldier Once … and Always by Mike Guardia.
page 87
!! Hal G. Moore was in the Airborne Branch, Not the Air Assault. Hal G. Moore’s job at the Pentagon was in the
Research and Development.
Hal G. Moore’s primary job was developing new airborne equipment and synchronizing Army – Air Force
requirements for airborne operations.
As a Fantasist and a liar Hal G. Moore had nothing to do with the development of the 11 Air Assault manual,
FM 57-35.
Hal G. Moore didn’t even know, they were writing the manual for Air Assault, during the time Hal G. Moore was
there in 1957.
FM 57-35 Army Transport Aviation-Combat Operations.
Hal G. Moore planned the Air Assault on LZ X-Ray FROM THE TAKE OFF.
Hal G. Moore and did not know his landing time at LZ X-Ray; nor did Hal G. Moore know the flight time to LZ
X-Ray, This was part of Air Assault training.
Even didn’t Bruce Crandall didn’t know what he was suppose to do!, Bruce Crandall had full fuel tanks for the
for the Air Assault on LZ X-Ray, his refueling point was over 35 miles away at Pleiku!
It would take over an hour and a half to refuel! before he could continue the assault on LZ X-Ray.
FM 57-35 Army Transport Aviation-Combat Operations, Huey’s should carry minimal amount of fuel with a 30
minutes of reserve, LZ X-Ray was only 14.3 miles away.
away, the refueling and ammo point should be by the loading Zone ( at PLEI ME).
Also Hal G. Moore did not have a Start Point, he did have alternate Landing Zones were Tango and Yankee
Hal G. Moore did not have and DELAY time, if something did not happen on time.
FM 57-35, When planning an Air Assault, you start from the time you planned to land at your objective and
then count backwards to the lift off time.
Hal G. Moore in 1957, After 4 years of claimed helping writing Air Assault tactics; and its training Hal G. Moore
still did not know Air Assault Tactics!! at LZ X-Ray; in 1965 Hal G. Moore and his troops would fire from the
Huey as they landed at the Landing Zone.
FM 57-35, there is no firing form the Huey during landing; or any other time.
When planning an Air Assault, you start from the time you planned to land at your objective; and then work
back backwards to the lift off time.
Hal G. Moore did not give the artillery anytime to change to different targets, at least 1 minute or the Huey’s 3
minutes to move out of the for the next Gunship and 1 minute for the Gunship to move out of the way for the
1/7 to land at LZ X-Ray.
The Artillery has 37 minutes of firing on three objectives.
8 minutes of diversion firing on LZ Tango.
1 minute to change to Yankee.
8 minutes of diversion firing on Yankee.
1 minute to change to LZ X-Ray.
20 minutes of firing on LZ X-Ray.
1 minute space between Artillery stop firing and the Gunships firing on LZ X-Ray.
30 seconds of ARA fire on LZ X-Ray.
3 minutes between ARA firing and the Gunship firing.
30 seconds of Gunship fire on LZ X-Ray.
total time 37 minutes + 3 minutes to change direction for the artillery and 3 minutes for the safety of the
gunships = 47 minutes.
Hal G. Moore’s first H hours time was 1030 hrs, but at 1017 there is a delay.
BUT Hal G. Moore had no new landing time at LZ X-Ray!
The artillery should have started firing on Tango around 0943.
at 0951 start firing on LZ Yankee at 1003 they should be firing on LZ X-Ray at 1024, 1027:30, 30 seconds of
ARA fire +3 minutes for the ARA to get out of the way of the Gunship, 102:30, 30 seconds of Gunship fire, 1
+1 minute before the 1/7 lands on LZ X-Ray
second time !! Hal G. Moore has no H hour.
what time did the artillery start firing on LZ TANGO, 1017?
The 1/7 and Hal G. Moore land at LZ X-Ray at 1048 hrs.
Hal G. Moore planned the Air Assault FROM THE TAKE OFF and did not know his landing time at LZ X-Ray.
Hal G. Moore as they load the Huey’s for LZ X-Ray!
Hal G. Moore “What is the flying time to LZ X-Ray 14.3 miles??!!
Hal G. Moore spends all day the 13, Nov, 1965 with Bruce Crandall planning the air assault on LZ X-Ray and
he never ask Bruce Crandall the flight time to LZ X-Ray.
Hal G. Moore ( Col. Klink of the Vietnam war, He knew nothing, nothing.) didn’t know Air Assault or basic
Infantry tactics, Hal G. Moore didn’t know what he was doing.
Hal G. Moore did not meet the basic requirement to get an early promotion to Major!!
In KOREA it’s FAKE COMBAT for Major Hal G. Moore was only in the mud for 16 day’s, in command of
company K.
Hal G. Moore Company Commander of K company from the 6 FEB 1953 to the 22 FEB 1953, as a company
commander 16 days, in command of Infantry troops, It’s Fake Combat for Hal G. Moore as K company was at
Sindam – Ni some 50 miles to the south and behind the MLR.
Also the 7th Infantry Division LEFT the MLR at the END of OCT 1952.
The 7th Infantry Division RETURNED to the MLR at the END of FEB 1953.
As a West Point graduate, Hal G. Moore was now a MAJOR with no combat experience.
While other company’s were commanded by ROTC officers, 1 & 2 LT’s and Captain’s.
How could people say that Hal G. Moore, verified Air Assault tactics that day, when Hal G. Moore said
page 41
Hal G. Moore ” I had been thinking about a new technique “that seemed tailor-made for this situation.
Hal G. Moore now gives the first Air Assault TACTIC, there were two, according to FM-57-35 Airmobile
Operations.
Hal G. Moore,” I was given only 16 Huey’s.”
Hal G. Moore did not ask for the CH – 47’s, that flew B company from Catecha that morning and took the
artillery to LZ Falcon.
Bruce Crandall had a CH-47 fly the 1/7’s ammo to Falcon!!
The Huey could carry 10 Troops each.
10 troops X 16 Huey’s = 160 Troops per lift.
Page 30. A enemy base camp.
Page 55. A radio transmission intercepted, estimated a N V regiment was near X-Ray.
Page 57. Commo wire was seen, (communication wire.)
Hal G. Moore “10 minutes before lift off, its was confirmed, Hal G. Moore is told by intelligence; he is
facing 1,500 enemy,” troops at X-Ray. ( NPR radio Terry Gross )
Page 39. Hal G. Moore puts only 80 men (5 per Huey) in the Assault lift the 1st lift.
Page 57. Riflemen extra ammo all they could carry!
FM 57-35 Air Assault tactics emphasize maximum initial lift, to get maximum lift each Huey carries
the minimum amount of fuel + 30 min reserve, with refueling & ammo Points near the
Pickup Zone.
Bruce Crandall had full fuel tanks, for the Air Assault on LZ X-Ray.
Bruce Crandall’s refueling point was at PLEIKU some 35 miles away!! requiring an hour and a half to refuel.
Troops should carry only basic load of ammo, and web gear (entrenching tool, 2 canteens,C ration, bayonet
and poncho; and 1st aid pack, with Burn packet).
Hal G. Moore to all troops, to carry all the ammo they could! where did they get the ammo from, as Hal G.
Moore said nothing about ammo; and where it was placed.
Page 40. Hal G. Moore “later lifts could carry more men 100 as fuel burned off”.
Page 198. The Rear area Operation Officer Dick Merchant “the Huey could carry 10 men”
Page 111. Winkle”I had a total of 16 men in my Huey.”
Fourner. “It was left up to each pilot how many men he carried.”
On later lifts. During the hotter time of the day, I was carrying 9-12 troops.
How it should have happen according to Air Assault Tactics FM 57-35.
With only 16 Huey’s weight is a factor, so the initial lift ( the assault echelon ) must
contain sufficient Troops to secure the Landing Zone.
The Allowable Cargo Load the ( ACL ) of each UH-1 D for this mission should have
been 3,000 pounds, as its under 50 nautical miles ( only 14.3 miles to the objective ).
Using the Space method.
A space is defined as the weight of a fully combat equipped troop ( 240 pounds ).
10 Troops = 2,400 pounds per Huey.
The way Hal G. Moore should have loaded his His Huey’s.
Page 39.
B co 114 troops, A co 40 troops, Ground Commanders command group 6 for a total of 160 troops in
the 1st lift.
Not 80 troops the way Hal G. Moore planned the assault.
Bruce Crandall didn’t fly the assault group into X-Ray, Jon Mills did.
page 40
Bruce Crandall is in the left seat the co – pilot seat, Hal G. Moore was behind him, so they Bruce Crandall
and Hal G. Moore could discus any last minute tactics.
Page 58.
Bruce Crandall ( The Aviation Commander ) is starting the Huey from the left seat the co-pilot seat,
when there is no starter on that side of the Huey.
Page 58.
Hal G. Moore as they load the Huey’s “what is the flying time from Plei Me to Landing Zone
X-Ray”? 14.3 miles.
Page 37. Hal G. Moore and Bruce Crandall plan an Air Assault.
Page 40. With a time table & failed to put down the flying time from Plei Me to Landing
Zone X-Ray, with out this information, How did they plan the Assault?
Page 58 Jon Mills 13 min 15 sec.
Page 59. Speed ( rate ) 110 knots this time will take them 25 miles away.
The correct time is 8 min.
Formula for Time.
Distance X 60 divide by Rate ( Speed ).
14.3 X 60 = 858 divide by 110 = 7.8 min = 8 min.
Time is rounded up to the nearest minute.
Formula for Distance is.
Rate ( Speed ) X time divided by 60.
110 X 8 = 880 divide by 60 = 14.6 miles = 15 miles.
Miles is rounded up to the nearest 1/2 mile.
using 7.8 min for time for the distance 110 X 7.8 = 858 divide by 60 = 14.3 miles,
And you get the distance from Plei Me to Landing Zone X-Ray.